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MALICIOUS, INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT MENTAL
DISTRESS IN FLORIDA
PATRICIA V. Russo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Causes of action for mental distress fall into three broad catego-
ries in Florida: malicious infliction of mental distress, intentional
infliction of mental distress, and negligent infliction of mental
distress.
One could draw order out of the patchwork of mental distress
cases in Florida by viewing them as a series of recurring fact pat-
terns. Unwholesome food is always compensated;' destruction of a
pet is always compensated, sometimes even when done merely neg-
ligently,2 but certainly when done maliciously;3 mental distress in-
volving the mistreatment of dead bodies is always compensated if
malice is involved,' but not when mere negligence is involved;5 and
before the area was preempted by federal law,6 mental distress
connected with telegraphic transmissions was usually compensated
as long as the language of the transmission warned of the possibil-
ity of harm.7 Termination of an "at will" employee is never com-
pensated;8 mental distress in domestic relations is never compen-
* Assistant Professor and Associate Dean, Florida State University College of Law.
LL.M., Yale, 1977; J.D., University of Florida, 1973; B.A., Florida State University, 1965. I
thank my colleagues, Larry George, Ken Vinson, and Chuck Ehrhardt for their helpful
suggestions.
1. Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957); Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
2. Knowles Animal Hosp. Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
3. LaPorte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964); Paul v. Osceola
County, 388 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA
1967).
4. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Scheuer v. Wille, 385 So. 2d 1076 (Fla.
4th DCA 1980); Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Cf. Trueba v. Per-
shing Indus., Inc., 374 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
5. Price v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1945); Dunahoo v. Best, 200 So.
541 (Fla. 1941); Estate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979); Trueba, 374 So. 2d 47; Brooks v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 325 So. 2d 479
(Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Kimple v. Riedel, 133 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
6. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kaufman, 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956); Price, 23 So. 2d
491.
7. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 129 So. 743 (Fla. 1930); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Wells, 39 So. 838 (Fla. 1905). Contra International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 14 So. 148
(Fla. 1893).
8. Gmuer v. Garner, 8 Fla. L.W. 649 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 21, 1983); Catania v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d
150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d
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sated;' mental distress is not compensated in actions involving an
insurer's dealings with its insured (or third parties) under con-
tracts of insurance10 unless active concealment, misrepresentation,
or actual bad faith is involved;" and mental distress actions
against participants in commitment proceedings will not be com-
pensated as long as the participants do not act with malice or in-
tent to inflict mental distress."'
By viewing cases as recurring fact patterns, some predictability
is provided for future cases. What is lacking, however, is propor-
tionality of result from one fact pattern to another, and a method
of delimiting the cause of action for the negligent infliction of
mental distress that avoids inconsistent and capricious results.
The purpose of this article is to describe the development of the
cause of action for mental distress in Florida, to describe various
requirements for the cause of action, and to show how judges
change the requirements from one case to another, thus confining
the cause of action in ways that do not comport with the articu-
lated benchmarks of the action. The appropriate basis for limiting
the cause of action for negligent infliction of mental distress is a
proximate cause test, because it allows for necessary judicial and
jury discretion, and provides at least as much certainty as present
DCA 1978), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Butler v. Lomelo, 355 So. 2d 1208 (Fi. 4th
DCA 1977); Dowling v. Blue Cross, 338 So. 2d 88 (FI. 1st DCA 1976); Henry Morrison
Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434 (FI. 4th DCA 1972).
9. Cordoba v. Cordoba, 393 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Mims v. Mines, 305 So. 2d
787, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) ("he lied when he said he loved me").
10. Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976); Stetz v. American
Casualty Co., 368 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Saltmarsh v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins.
Exch., 344 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Contra Lopez v. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 406 So. 2d
1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
11. Habelow v. Travelers Ins. Co., 389 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); World Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); cf. Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155. However, an insurer
will not be heard to argue that a count for mental distress and punitive damages must be
struck from a court for breach of contract because evidence of net worth might prejudice the
jury on the determination of the breach of contract. This "spill-over" theory has been re-
jected. See United States Auto. Ass'n v. Byrd, 370 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 8 Fla. L.W. 994 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 6,
1983) in which the court awarded wrongful death damages and attorney's fees based upon
the insurer's intentional infliction of mental distress, but declined to award mental distress
damages because the legislature did not provide for such damages in the Wrongful Death
Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (Supp. 1982). The court's authority for awarding attorney's fees is
unclear; perhaps the award is based upon the contract of insurance. However, it is clear that
damages under the Wrongful Death Act are insufficient to deter the intentional misconduct
that occurred in this case, and intentional misconduct generally.
12. Bencomo v. Morgan, 210 So. 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Cawthon v. Coffer, 264 So. 2d
873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
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limitations provide.
II. MALICIOUS INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
The genesis of malicious infliction of mental distress is Kirksey
v. Jernigan,13 in which the Florida Supreme Court held that its
reluctance to allow a cause of action for negligent infliction of
mental distress would not limit the availability of recovery in cases
where the defendant's conduct implied malice. The court said mal-
ice would be implied whenever the defendant acted with "great in-
difference" to the rights of plaintiff or to plaintiff's property. The
Kirksey court implied malice in the defendant's refusal to relin-
quish the body of the plaintiff's dead child until twice the normal
embalming fee had been paid by the mother, an "impecunious
colored woman. 14
Subsequent cases in which the court implied malice in the defen-
dant's conduct included the act of throwing a garbage can at a dog
by a "garbage gatherer," with the result that the dog, Heidi, was
hit and died from the blow;" the act of "destroying" a dog by a
veterinarian, in order to cover-up veterinary malpractice; 6 a medi-
cal doctor's act of performing an autopsy over the strenuous objec-
tions of the children of the deceased in order to better defend
against a feared medical malpractice suit;"1 and the demand of a
policeman to return, under pain of arrest, a legally repossessed au-
tomobile to the debtor, his friend.'8 In addition, a court held there
could be recovery of mental distress damages for the extermination
by the county of "Big Foot," a seven-toed cat, before the required
three-day waiting period, if the jury found malice, that is, "great
indifference" to the property rights of the plaintiff.' 9
Courts have declined to imply malice, however, where a medical
examiner refused to relinquish the body of the plaintiff's son,
killed in an automobile accident, but mistakenly identified by the
13. 45 So. 2d 188. The possibility of such a case was suggested in International Ocean,
14 So. 148.
14. Kirksey, 45 So. 2d at 189.
15. La Porte, 163 So. 2d 267.
16. Levine, 197 So. 2d 329. See also the act of leaving a dog on a heating pad too long by
a veterinarian, Knowles, 360 So. 2d 37, discussed infra.
17. Jackson, 228 So. 2d 916.
18. City of Deland v. Florida Transp. and Leasing Corp., 293 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA
1974). This was an intentional cause of action, but the court disposed of it as malice. Cf.
Claycomb v. Eichles, 399 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
19. Paul, 388 So. 2d 40.
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police as someone else; 0 where a hospital "misplaced and never
again located" the body of plaintiff's premature infant;21 where a
hospital sent home plaintiff's newborn with the wrong parents;2
where medical doctors, in good faith, participated in commitment
proceedings;23 where plaintiff's deceased husband was embalmed
by an undertaker not of her choosing;2' and where an insurance
company hired an unqualified medical doctor to examine an insur-
ance applicant2 8
Courts have also refused to imply malice in cases of termination
of employment,21 even in one case27 where at least "great indiffer-
ence" if not intent should have been found, because the defen-
dant's agent occupied a position of authority over the plaintiff,
which imposes a higher duty upon the defendant.2 The defen-
dant's agent encouraged the plaintiff to lie, then fired her for doing
SO.29
Then there have been cases where courts implied malice too eas-
ily, and permitted recovery for "great indifference" that looked a
lot like ordinary negligence and was clearly not intentional miscon-
duct, as when defendant veterinarian left a post-operative animal
on a heating pad for a day and a half, and the animal died from
20. Przybyszewski v. Metropolitan Dade County, 363 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
21. Brooks, 325 So. 2d 479.
22. Carter v. Lake Wales Hosp. Ass'n., 213 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
23. Bencomo, 210 So. 2d 236; Cawthon, 264 So. 2d 873.
24. Kimple, 133 So. 2d 437. Plaintiff's husband died of a heart attack in his doctor's
office while plaintiff was out of the city, and the coroner requested that the defendant fu-
neral home owner pick up the body. Defendant went to considerable trouble to find the
deceased's wife in a nearby city, sent a car for her, and arranged for a minister and an
acquaintance of the plaintiff to travel in the car to greet and comfort her. When requested
to transfer the body of the deceased to the funeral home of the plaintiff's choice, defendant
indicated that the embalming process had already begun, but after it was completed he did
so, and was later paid the customary embalming fee by the other funeral director.
25. Peeler v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 206 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
The liability of the unqualified doctor was not at issue.
26. Catania, 381 So. 2d 265; Gellert v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 370 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979) (removal of important privileges of an employee under contract short of termi-
nation); DeMarco, 360 So. 2d 134; Butler, 355 So. 2d 1208; Dowling, 338 So. 2d 88; Henry
Morrison Flagler Museum, 268 So. 2d 434.
27. Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
28. See City of Deland, 293 So. 2d 800; Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn.
1926); Janvier v. Sweeney, 2 K.B. 316 (1919); W. Paossaa, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12, at 56-57 (4th ed. 1971). "The extreme and outrageous nature of the [actionable] con-
duct may arise not so much from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some
relation or position which gives him actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff's in-
terests. The result is something very like extortion." Id.
29. Anderson, 82 So. 2d at 151-52.
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the resulting burn.80
Two significant limitations have been imposed upon the implied
malice or "great indifference" test of Kirksey. First, the Kirksey
test only allows mental distress damages when some other inten-
tional or malicious tort has been committed. This limitation
originated in Slocum v. Food Fair Stores,"1 in which the court gave
a restrictive misreading to the rule of Kirksey.3 2 Because the Kirk-
sey test is sound, and has not been overruled, the Slocum limita-
tion is perhaps an aberration.
The second limitation is peculiar to cases in which an insurance
company is the defendant. In those cases, "great indifference" will
not suffice to provide recovery for mental distress. Instead, "active
concealment and misrepresentation" or "actual bad faith" is re-
quired."3 In the cases in which this requirement is imposed, the
limitation is sometimes expressed as a contract limitation upon the
tort suit.34 This limitation, imposed by the Florida Supreme Court,
was ignored by a Fourth District Court of Appeal case in which no
such limitation was mentioned in the court's decision to send a
case to the jury.3
In addition to these limitations, a few courts have established
punitive damages as a threshold test of malice, 6 and have held
that gross negligence is not the legal equivalent of malice and will
not support the award of punitive damages,3 7 a roundabout way of
30. Knowles, 360 So. 2d 37.
31. 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
32. It is not clear whether Kirksey even met the requirement. There were two other
counts in the Kirksey case; they dealt with interference with dead bodies.
33. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d 816; Stetz, 368 So. 2d 912; Saltmarsh, 344 So. 2d at 863;
World Ins., 308 So. 2d 612; MacDonald v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1973). When the court says, "deliberate, overt and dishonest dealing," it obviously
means more than unlawfully and deliberately refusing to pay what is owed. See Metropoli-
tan Life, 8 Fla. L.W. at 995 for "evidence of 'bad blood'" amounting to intentional miscon-
duct. The appellate court awarded damages under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT.
§ 768.21 (Supp. 1982). Because the Act does not provide mental distress damages, the appel-
late court reversed the trial court's mental distress award. It is clear that damages under the
Act are insufficient to deter intentional misconduct. This deserves legislative attention.
34. Butchikas, 343 So. 2d at 817 n.2.
35. Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155. In the court's terms, the case involved negligence of the
insurer in failing to secure the consent of the insured to a life insurance policy purchased by
the insured's murderous wife. But "great indifference" is suggested by the insurer's failure
to honor the insured's order to cancel the policy, and failure to note and respond appropri-
ately to the fact that the premiums on the policy totalled one half of the insured's annual
income.
36. Saltmarsh, 344 So. 2d at 863; Carter, 213 So. 2d 898; Kimple, 133 So. 2d at 439.
This, of course, merely begs the question.
37. Carter, 213 So. 2d at 900. "[Glross negligence . . .is that kind or degree of negli-
1983]
344 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:339
saying that gross negligence is not the legal equivalent of malice.
The implied malice or "great indifference" test for imposing lia-
bility for the infliction of mental distress in Florida is an important
one. Most of the cases decided under this test involved intentional
conduct, but had -the cases been analyzed as intentional mental
distress actions, recovery would have been doubtful because of ad-
ditional restrictions on the intentional mental distress action dis-
cussed below. In fact, at least one case that was filed as an inten-
tional action was decided based upon the "great indifference"
analysis, with no attempt whatsoever to examine the requirements
of an intentional cause of action: outrageous conduct and severe
distress.88 As a result, a policeman's demand that the plaintiff im-
mediately surrender a legally repossessed car, in order to recover
the car for a friend of the policeman who had complained to him
about the repossession, was held to imply malice sufficient to sup-
port recovery, without a finding that the distress which resulted
was severe." No doubt the conduct involved was outrageous, but
the dispensation from the severe distress requirement was
generous.' 0
Thus, while Florida courts hold a very firm doctrinal line in both
intentional and negligent mental distress actions, they tolerate this
hybrid malice action,'1 which allows easier access to recovery than
either intentional or negligent infliction of mental distress, and is
especially useful when mistreatment of dead bodies or animals is
gence which lies in the area between ordinary negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct
sufficient to support a judgment for exemplary or punitive damages ... " Id. (quoting Car-
raway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla. 1959)). Thus, the court stated, even gross negligence
will not support recovery under the rule of Kirksey.
38. See City of Deland, 293 So. 2d 800.
39. Id.
40. In Slocum, 100 So. 2d 396, Mrs. Slocum was not allowed to recover despite a heart
attack, because the court held that the insult she suffered was not sufficiently outrageous.
41. Federal Ins. Co. v. Applestein, 377 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), demonstrates the
importance of recognizing this hybrid, and the subtle distinctions among negligent, mali-
cious and intentional actions. Plaintiff Mackin sued Applestein; Applestein was insured by
Federal. The insurer's policy excluded acts committed with intent, yet the substantive law
of mental distress restricts compensation for simple negligence. The plaintiff apparently at-
tempted to steer his way between these limitations by alleging malice in order to come
within the rule of Kirksey, alleging something more than negligence, but something less
than intent. The court found that the plaintiff had alleged too much intent for the insurance
policy at issue to apply. Everyone (the defendant Applestein, the Applestein Trust, and the
plaintiff Mackin) but the insurance company wanted the coverage of the insurance policy to
apply. Belatedly recognizing the subtlety of the middle ground, the plaintiff amended his
complaint to claim that Applestein acted "only with imputed or implied malice," and thus
survived a motion to dismiss. Mackin v. Applestein, 404 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
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involved."' In fact, this respect shown by the courts for affronts
suffered by survivors through callousness toward dead bodies and
animals is somewhat ironic when contrasted to the judicial treat-
ment of the living.' 8
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores is the first and only Florida Supreme
Court case" to consider the action for the intentional infliction of
mental distress.45 But Florida had been allowing the action for
quite some time under the rubric of implied malice. e The Slocum
opinion set out the requirements for the cause of action for inten-
tional mental distress: severe distress and outrageous conduct.
Outrageous conduct has been defined by decisions of the district
courts of appeal. It includes saying to a child: "Do you know that a
man is sleeping in your mother's room?";47 falsely telling the pur-
chaser of a car who used a forged signature that a warrant had
been issued for her arrest, and that the police would pick her up if
she did not return the car immediately; " holding patrons of a
42. La Porte, 163 So. 2d 267; Paul, 388 So. 2d 40; Scheuer, 385 So. 2d 1076; Knowles, 60
So. 2d 37; Jackson, 228 So. 2d 916; Levine, 197 So. 2d 329.
43. See Carter, 213 So. 2d 898. See also Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974);
Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348 (FI.
1st DCA 1981); Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pazo v. Upjohn
Co., 310 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); (all discussed in negligence section, infra).
44. In Wells, 39 So. 838, recovery was had for the intentional refusal by an employee of
Western Union to pay over funds to the plaintiff until a typographical error in his name was
corrected. As a result, the plaintiff and his wife and children went without food or a sleeping
compartment on the train for the remainder of their journey. This case is unusual because
the facts implied negligence, but the court inferred an intentional action. 'This action was
not based upon the failure of the telegraph company in promptness, but upon its willful
refusal to pay over money to the plaintiff under... circumstances... made known fully
[to defendant's agent]." Id. at 840-41. But it is not clear that either outrageous conduct or
even malice existed, just plain vanilla stupidity.
45. The court has recently been invited to consider the intentional mental distress action
again in Gmuer, 8 Fla. L.W. 649, by way of a certified question whether one may recover for
intentional mental distress not incident to "any separate tort or other actionable wrong." Id.
The case, however, did not reach the Florida Supreme Court because neither the plaintiff
nor defendant petitioned to have it heard by the Florida Supreme Court after the Second
District Court of Appeal had certified it,
46. Mrs. Slocum would have recovered for implied malice but for the fact that the court
grafted a new requirement onto the earlier implied malice requirement - the need for an
independent tort. The court cited Kirksey for this requirement, but no such requirement
was announced in that case. It is not clear whether Kirksey even met the requirement.
There were two other counts in the Kirksey case; they dealt with interference with dead
bodies.
47. Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
48. Abraham Used Car Co. v. Silva, 208 So. 2d 500 (FI. 3d DCA 1968).
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marine supply company at gunpoint in an altercation over the
right to possess a yacht;4" telling the mother of a debtor, in an at-
tempt to discover the debtor's whereabouts, that the debtor's two
minor children were seriously injured and in the hospital when in
fact neither was true;50 telling an insured, "We don't have to ex-
plain the insurance coverage to you. . . . All I'm interested in is
getting you off your butt and back to work"; 51 telling an insured,
"You know damn well you had that disease when you took the pol-
icy," which was untrue; 2 actual bad faith on the part of an insurer,
including attempts to "buy up" the insurance policy;53 an insurer's
advising the owner of a pet store not to tell a customer who had
been bitten by a skunk that the skunk was sold and subsequently
lost, instead of being tested for rabies, thereby exposing the con-
sumer to a risk of rabies injections;54 a union's hanging in effigy a
likeness of plaintiff "scab" and displaying the effigy outside the
plaintiff's workplace and home;55 embalming a person whose reli-
gious beliefs forbid embalming, if the embalmer knew of the de-
ceased's religious beliefs, or proceeded in violation of regulations
governing the industry;56 and outrageous conduct may include an
attorney's resort to self-help in the taking of jewelry by guile as
security for a debt and refusal to return it upon request of the
owner, if such acts amount to a breach of the peace;57 and a news-
paper's publication of a photograph of a woman draped only in a
towel, while she was being removed, in a state of shock, from the
49. Geary v. Starr, 418 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
50. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
51. Habelow, 389 So. 2d at 219.
52. Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. lst DCA 1970). The agent
of the company, under false pretenses, wrongfully took the original policy from the plaintiff
and never returned it.
53. World Ins., 308 So. 2d 612; see also the discussion of Metropolitan Life, supra note
33.
54. Kirkpatrick v. Zitz, 401 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
55. Stevens v. Home, 325 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
56. Scheuer, 385 So. 2d 1076.
57. Medel v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 365 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Medel sued for
intentional infliction of mental distress and conversion against an attorney, Striar, and the
attorney's principal, a bank. The bank had a judgment against Medel for $11,530.17. At a
deposition of Medel taken in connection with another case, Striar asked to see Medel's
watch, ring and bracelet. When Striar had these items in his possession he announced that
he was keeping the items, and turning them over to the bank to satisfy the bank's judgment
against Medel. Medel objected; the police were called and responded; Striar urged the police
to call their legal advisor to confirm that a judgment creditor could resort to self-help if he
did not commit a breach of the peace; they did so; Striar exited with the police. In a subse-
quent legal action Striar was ordered by the court to return the jewelry to Medel, and Medel
then filed the instant suit. Id. at 783-84.
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scene of her husband's suicide. 8
Outrageous conduct does not include collecting bills by repeated
phone calls and unpleasant scenes at the threshold of the debtor's
home;59 mailing a debtor a complaint for collection that had never
been filed;60 insurer A disclosing to insurer B a statement of its
insured that was detrimental in insured's lawsuit against insurer
B;" nor saying to a consumer in a grocery store: "you stink to
me."'62 Nor was outrageous conduct established where defendant
took a picture of the silhouette of plaintiff's dead daughter at the
request of the police and fire marshall;13 where a medical doctor, in
good faith, participated in a commitment proceeding;" ' where a
cemetery moved an entire vault without disturbing the body
therein;'5 where defendant shouted racial epithets in a dispute over
a parking space;66 where an airline grounded a pilot who believed
the airline's planes were defective, but medical witnesses found the
action of the airline justified;67 nor where an author wrote a story
about the plaintiff's deceased husband describing him as a ghost,
at least where the deceased's former co-workers believed that he
was indeed a ghost, and the author factually related the events
which led to these beliefs."
And Florida courts have consistently held that there is no outra-
geous conduct involved when an employer terminates an "at will"
employee, no matter how high-handedly the firing is accom-
plished.6 9 One Florida court held that outrageous conduct does not
58. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
59. Stockett v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 269 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Sacco v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 234 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). These acts can give rise to other causes of
action: trespass, defamation and statutory actions for violations of the Consumer Collection
Practices Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-78 (1981).
60. Steiner & Munach v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
61. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Riley, 294 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
62. Slocum, 100 So. 2d at 397.
63. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
930 (1977).
64. Bencomo, 210 So. 2d 236.
65. Trueba, 374 So. 2d 47.
66. Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (although an
action for assault may lie); see also Lay v. Kremer 411 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
67. Gellert, 370 So. 2d 802.
68. Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
69. See Gmuer, 8 Fla. L.W. 649; Dowling, 338 So. 2d 88; see also DeMarco, 360 So. 2d
134; Butler, 355 So. 2d 1208; Henry Morrison Flagler Museum, 268 So. 2d 434. In Gmuer,
the Second District Court of Appeal approved a trial court's determination that Florida
does not recognize the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. This determination is
amazing in view of the numerous Florida cases decided upon the basis of intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress, discussed in this section.
19831
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include a grocery chain security advisor telling an employee, who
was undergoing a lie detector test, that she must admit to having
stolen from. the chain for the test to be effective. She made the
admission in reliance upon his direction, and was subsequently dis-
charged for her admission.7 0 Anderson is wrongly decided. Horn-
book law tells us that persons in a position of authority, such as
security advisors for an entire chain of stores, are held to a higher
standard of conduct in intentional mental distress cases than those
who do not enjoy a position of power and authority.7 1
The severe distress requirement has been found to be satisfied
where a woman was hospitalized as a result of her distress, re-
strained during the hospitalization, and suffered permanent dimin-
ished use of one hand as a result of the restraint;72 where the plain-
tiff had to undergo a series of rabies shots as a result of defendant
insurer's advice to its pet-store-owner insured to sell the skunk
that bit the plaintiff;78 and where the plaintiff spent seven hours in
a state of extreme anxiety about the life of his two minor children
because the defendant lied about the children's involvement in an
accident.7 '
On the other hand, the severe distress of a heart attack is not
sufficient if the conduct which brought it on is not deemed legally
outrageous;75 nor is the distress accompanying the loss of a lawsuit
sufficient if the acts complained of did not show an intent to inflict
mental distress.7
In intentional mental distress cases, Florida courts have ignored
the usual rules limiting transferred intent. Transferred intent re-
fers to two things: transferring the requisite intent from person A
to person B, and transferring the requisite intent from tort A to
tort B. Neither type of transferred intent is usually available in
mental distress cases. Nonetheless, in Florida, intent has been
70. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150.
71. See PnossaR, supra note 28. See also Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn.
1926) (student pressed into making false confession by school authorities); Lipman v Atlan-
tic Coast Line R. Co., 93 S.E. 714 (S.C. 1917) (plaintiff railroad passenger recovered when
railroad employee told him he was a lunatic and the employee would gladly give him two
black eyes if he were off duty).
72. Abraham Used Car, 208 So. 2d 500.
73. Kirkpatrick, 401 So. 2d 850.
74. Ford Motor Credit Co., 373 So. 2d 956.
75. Slocum, 100 So. 2d 396.
76. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 294 So. 2d 59.
77. PRossM, supra note 28, at 60-61. The intentional element of a property tort, like
conversion, may satisfy the intention requirement of other related torts, except mental dis-
tress. Generally, in Florida, however, even intentional mental distress can be satisfied by
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transferred from the tort of conversion to the tort of mental dis-
tress rather uniformly in cases involving the destruction of pets,
even where it is not clear that intentional misconduct occurred.78
Ironically, transfer of intent has not been allowed where dead
human bodies are destroyed, lost, or moved, although case law rec-
ognizes a property right in dead bodies.7
Transfer of intent between persons has not been allowed in Flor-
ida, the most famous case being one where defendant failed to pro-
vide adequate security on his business premises and as a result, a
minor daughter witnessed the sexual assault of her mother. No re-
covery was permitted for the daughter's well-documented mental
distress.80 But this case and several others involving auto and drug
accidents do not present the issue squarely, for they involved negli-
gence on the part of the defendant rather than intentional miscon-
duct.81 One case, however, did involve intentional misconduct, and
yet no recovery was permitted. The case involved the statement to
plaintiff's husband: "We don't have to explain the insurance cover-
age to you. . . .All I'm interested in is getting you off your butt
and back to work."' The statement added to her husband's woes,
and thus to her own. Her suit for her mental distress was dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action.88
showing the intent needed to support liability for conversion of a dead pet, though not a
dead relative. On the other hand, if tortious intent is shown with respect to a particular
victim, another victim's mental distress injuries cannot "borrow" the malice or other intent
established by the first victim. See also W. PRosSER, J. WADE AND V. SCHWAirZ, CASES AND
MATERALS ON ToRTs (7th ed. 1982).
This doctrine of "transferred intent" is something of a freak. It was derived origi-
nally from the criminal law, and goes back to the time when tort damages were
awarded as a side issue in criminal prosecutions. It is famliar enough in the crimi-
nal law, and has been applied in several tort cases where the defendant has shot at
A, or thrown a rock at him, and has quite unintentionaly hit B instead . . [I]t
applies whenever both the tort intended and that which results fall within the
scope of the old action of trespass-that is, where both involve direct and immedi-
ate application of force to the person or to tangible property. There are five torts
that fall within the trespass writ. Battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to
land, and trespass to chattels. When the defendant intends any one of the five,
and accidentally accomplishes any one of the five, he is liable.
Id. at 29.
78. La Porte, 163 So. 2d 267; Paul, 388 So. 2d 40; Knowles, 360 So. 2d 37 (apparently
negligence); Levine, 197 So. 2d 329.
79. Trueba, 374 So. 2d 47; Brooks, 325 So. 2d 479 (negligence). However, plaintiff has
recovered where malice was shown. See Kirksey, 45 So. 2d 188; Jackson, 228 So. 2d 916.
80. Woodman, 367 So. 2d 1061.
81. Champion, 420 So. 2d 348; Selfe, 397 So. 2d 348; Pazo, 310 So. 2d 30.
82. Habelow, 389 So. 2d at 219.
83. Id. at 220.
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IV. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
The most difficult Florida tort to classify systematically in terms
of its prima facie elements is the negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress. The usually articulated requirement for this cause of action
is impact. But impact means physical contact in some cases and
non-contactually caused physical injury in others. Still other cases
require that mental and physical injury occur in a required tempo-
ral sequence-first the physical, and then the mental. Sometimes
the courts seem to require physical injury when the facts include
physically harmless contact, yet contact when the facts include se-
rious physical injury that is not directly consequential to a physical
contact. Some cases turn upon the element of foreseeable harm, a
proximate cause requirement, which is a familiar standard in torts,
and a standard which avoids the rigidity of the impact require-
ment. Proximate cause also provides flexibility under one stan-
dard, an advantage over the present device of an announced im-
pact standard with its changing definition of impact-sometimes
contact, sometimes physical injury and sometimes a required tem-
poral sequence of damages. Thus, the proximate cause standard is
more candid, a feature which enhances respect for the law. The
Florida Supreme Court has a current opportunity to review the
area and bring order to it, and to adopt a proximate cause test.8
A. Physical Injury
The physical injury test is often stated as a threshold test in
Florida, upon which other requirements will be layered. For exam-
ple, the earliest negligent infliction of mental distress case in Flor-
ida85 required at least physical injury, and then that the physical
injury occur in a required sequence. 86 The defendant's failure to
deliver the telegram "Wife dying. Come at once. . .," from a hos-
pital to the husband of one of the hospital's patients, prevented
the husband from attending his wife at her death, 7 and as a result,
he suffered great anguish.s" The court held that only "mental suf-
fering incident to, connected with, and flowing directly from the
physical injury" could be compensated, and denied recovery.89
84. Champion, 420 So. 2d 348.
85. International Ocean, 14 So. 148.
86. See discussion of the temporal sequence requirement infra.
87. International Ocean, 14 So. at 148.
88. Id. at 149.
89. Id. at 151.
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Similarly, the court denied recovery for mental anguish "uncon-
nected with physical injury" to a man who suffered anguish be-
cause of the negligent embalming of his wife;'0 to a woman who
was distressed because the body of her husband was embalmed by
an undertaker not of her choosing; 1 to the parents of a newborn
infant negligently sent home with the wrong parents by hospital
personnel;92 and to a distraught mother whose premature infant's
body was negligently "misplaced and never again located" in de-
fendant's hospital.'3
The absence of physical injury was also cited among the reasons
for denial of recovery where defendant insurer cancelled an insur-
ance policy and denied personal injury protection (PIP) benefits
under the cancelled policy without overt and dishonest dealing;94
where plaintiff objected to defendant insurer's attempt to settle a
claim but could not show overt and dishonest dealing;9 where city
firemen were furloughed from their jobs pursuant to reasonable
procedures; 9' and where a bank teller was handed a hold-up note
by a robber during the course of her employment.'7
Conversely, the presence of physical injury was cited among the
reasons for recovery where the plaintiff was negligently electrified
by an electric company;' 8 where the defendant negligently included
a rat in a cola, which acted as an emetic;"1 and where the defen-
dant negligently included worms in a can of "fancy" spinach,
which acted as both an emetic and a laxative. 100
90. Dunahoo, 200 So. at 542.
91. Kimple, 133 So. 2d 437. This case was pleaded as a malice case, but the court found
neither malice nor physical injury. While the plaintiff was out of town, her husband died of
a heart attack in his doctor's office, and the defendant was summoned to remove the body.
The defendant went to considerable effort to locate the plaintiff in a neighboring city, and
sent a car for her, along with her minister and a friend to console her. When the plaintiff
asked the defendant to deliver the body to another funeral home, he delayed until the fol-
lowing morning because the embalming process was already in progress. For his efforts, he
charged only the usual embalming fee. Id. at 438-39.
92. Carter, 213 So. 2d 898. The court denied a cause of action to the infant's mother
because "[n]either the child nor its mother. . . sustained any physical injury." Id. at 899.
93. Brooks, 325 So. 2d 479. The court found "[t]here was no evidence of... physical
injury" to the mother. Id.
94. Saltmarsh, 344 So. 2d 862. This case is particularly interesting because it implies
that physical injury is synonymous with battery. Id. at 863.
95. Stetz, 368 So. 2d 912.
96. Butler, 355 So. 2d 1208.
97. Davis v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 408 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
98. Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op, Inc., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958).
99. Way, 260 So. 2d 288. This case presents a variant of the physcial injury test-the
physical reaction test. Id. at 289.
100. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860.
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The difficult cases to understand, and the ones that are probably
wrongly decided, are those in which the courts have denied recov-
ery where physical injury exists, while claiming to apply a physical
injury test;101 and those where very serious physical injury existed,
but the courts ignored the physical injury test and announced
some other test instead.1 02
This willingness to compensate mental distress which accompa-
nies vomiting and diarrhea, and to ignore mental distress which
accompanies crippling and death, is an undesirable inconsistency
in the law of negligent mental distress.
B. Temporal Sequence
For years before Florida courts announced the impact test for
the negligent infliction of mental distress,103 they struggled with a
direct injury test that evolved into a requirement that physical in-
jury must precede mental injury in order for recovery for mental
distress to be permitted. In International Ocean Telegraph v.
Saunders,"' the first negligent mental distress case in the state,
the Florida Supreme Court, in a two to one decision, held that
there was no cause of action for the failure to promptly deliver a
telegram.105 The court announced that mental injury could be com-
pensated "when coupled with or accompanied by substantive in-
jury to the person. . . in such cases the mental suffering growing
101. See Claycomb, 399 So. 2d at 1051 (where the plaintiffs put on expert testimony of
physical injury).
102. See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974) (where the plaintiff suffered a
heart attack, was admitted to an intensive care unit, and eventually died). The tremendous
confusion surrounding an asserted physical injury test is plainly illustrated in the statement
of the district court of appeal in Stewart v. Gilliam: "When she [Mrs. Stewart] was ex-
amined at the hospital there were no outward signs of physical injury." Stewart v. Gilliam,
271 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), quashed 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). Obviously,
when Mrs. Stewart was examined in the hospital, she was suffering enormous physical in-
jury. She was admitted to the intensive care unit with myocardial infarction, and later suf-
fered a cerebral hemorrhage. But when the court says "physical injury," it sometimes means
physical contact, not physical injury. In other words, there were no outward signs of physi-
cal contact. And the fact that Mrs. Stewart's brain was bleeding and her heart tissue dying
was too complicated a physical injury for the court to comprehend, apparently because these
were not visible to the naked eye.
See also Champion, 420 So. 2d 348 (where the plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and died
on the spot); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (where the plain-
tiff suffered Larsen's Syndrome, literally a crippling disease).
103. The impact test had been expressly rejected in Victorian Railways Comm'rs v.
Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 405 (P.C. 1888), and did not appear in Florida until 1954 in Crane v.
Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
104. 14 So. 148.
105. Id. at 148 ("Wife dying. Come at once.. .
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out of and produced by the physical injury is so interwoven with
the latter that it is impossible to consider the one without contem-
plating the other."'" The rule, while appearing to be a simple
physical injury requirement, is actually a temporal sequence of
damages requirement. First there must be physical injury and then
mental injury-it will not do if the mental injury occurs before the
physical. The required temporal sequence of damages is also sug-
gested in another passage of the opinion, where the court says that
only mental suffering "incident to, connected with, and flowing di-
rectly from the physical injury" can be considered.10 7 Thus physi-
cal injury is merely a threshold requirement. Once physical injury
exists, the question then becomes whether the physical injury pre-
ceded and "produced" the mental injury.108
The temporal sequence requirement, born in International
Ocean and reaching its apogee in Gilliam,10 received regular at-
tention in the interim cases.
For example, in a case involving the negligent inclusion of worms
in a can of "fancy" spinach, the defendant argued that the tempo-
ral sequence requirement had not been met, that is, that the
mental reaction to the worms, and not the worms themselves, pro-
duced physical injury." 0 The court found worms in spinach to be
"nauseous intruders" and "generally frowned upon""' and ap-
proved the jury's verdict of $3,000, despite the defendant's argu-
ment that it was only worth $100 per meal to eat worms.' The
court found that the jury had ample evidence from which to con-
clude that the worms, not the mind, produced the plaintiff's
injury.118
And in Slocum v. Food Fair Stores,114 a case where defendant's
epithet was followed by plaintiff's heart attack, the defendant ar-
gued that "the only direct injury" in the case was "mental or emo-
106. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 151.
10S. Id. at 149.
109. 291 So. 2d 593, discussed infra.
110. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860. Presumably "fancy" referred to the grade of spinach, not
the presence of worms.
111. Id. at 860-61. Mrs. Macurda noticed a worm and segments of worms in her half-
eaten serving of Food Fair "fancy" spinach. Unfortunately, her husband had either started
before her or ate faster than she did because he had already consumed "practically his en-
tire helping" before his wife's discovery.
112. Id. at 862.
113. Id. The "physical injury" in this case included vomiting, stomach pains and diar-
rhea. Id. at 861.
114. 100 So. 2d 396.
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tional with physical symptoms merely derivative therefrom.""' ,
The court responded that "[n]o great difficulty is involved" be-
cause the case presented an intentional tort, not a negligent one,
and would therefore be decided on other grounds. " 6
In Clark v. Choctawhatchee Electric Co-Operative, Inc.," 7
where the plaintiff was negligently electrified by an electric com-
pany, the trial judge paid more attention to the temporal sequence
of damages than to the physical disability that occurred. He "de-
duced that the sensations and symptoms experienced [by the
plaintiff] immediately after the incident arose from fright and not
from impact or trauma . .. [although he] thought the testimony
'amply' supported the conclusion that she sustained a serious emo-
tional disturbance resulting in physical disability."118 In Arcia,"9
where the plaintiff, a seven-year-old child, was frightened when
part of the bathroom ceiling collapsed and almost hit her while she
was bathing, the defendant argued, among other things, that inju-
ries, if any, were caused solely by fright,120 that is, that mental re-
action preceded physical injury.
In the interim between International Ocean and Gilliam, Flor-
ida courts sometimes said they were adhering to the temporal se-
quence requirement when the facts belied them. For example, in
the Hoitt case12 1 where the plaintiff, frightened by a gas explosion,
was injured when she collided with another restaurant employee,
fright preceded physical injury, yet the plaintiff was allowed to get
by a summary judgment for the defendant and proceed to trial.12
The court claimed that the case did not represent an effort to re-
cover where the only direct injury was mental, with physical symp-
toms merely derivative therefrom.1 28 This, of course, simply is not
true. The case represents precisely an effort to recover for physical
symptoms merely derivative from mental fright. And the case is
properly decided, because efforts to escape from negligently cre-
ated peril are foreseeable and reasonably to be expected. 2"' This is
115. Id. at 397.
116. Id.
117. 107 So. 2d 609.
118. Id. at 611. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's factual conclusions
regarding impact, and thus reversed. Id. at 612.
119. Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
120. Id. at 865.
121. Hoitt v. Lee's Propane Gas Serv., Inc., 182 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
122. Id. at 59-61.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 60 (citing 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 77 at 736).
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true whether the peril is a falling ceiling, a loud explosion, or a
loud collision.
The Gilliam"'5 case is the most disturbing example of the tem-
poral sequence requirement in action. The facts of the case in-
volved a negligent collision between two automobiles which caused
the automobiles to collide with the Stewart's home and a tree in
their front yard. 2 The Stewarts were inside their home at the
time of the collision. Shortly after the collision, and as a result of
the excitement of the collision, Mrs. Stewart experienced chest
pains and was admitted to the intensive care unit of a hospital.""'
The supreme court said that the trial court's entry of summary
judgment was consistent with the rule that there can be no recov-
ery for "mental pain and suffering unaccompanied by any physical
injuries in the absence of. . .malice. 1 28 Obviously, in this case,
physical injury accompanied the mental pain and suffering. When
the court said "unaccompanied by physical injuries," the court
meant that damages must occur in the required temporal se-
quence:129 first physical damage, then mental distress. If mental
distress precedes the physical damage, there will be no recovery,
even if the physical damage is very serious - heart attack, stroke
and eventual death.130
One can view the temporal sequence requirement as a round-
about impact requirement; the Florida Supreme Court in its most
problematic case, Gilliam, relied heavily on both. The temporal se-
quence requirement and the impact requirement are equally tech-
nical restrictions upon the negligent mental distress cause of ac-
tion. Like the impact requirement, the temporal sequence
requirement demands more than physical injury for recovery to be
permitted. And like the impact requirement, it does not insure
that injuries are authentic.
C. Contact
The impact requirement, the controlling factor in so many re-
125. 291 So. 2d 593. The Gilliam case is also discussed in the contact section, infra.
126. Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 467.
127. Id.
128. Gilliam, 291 So. 2d at 594.
129. Unfortunately, the supreme court was so busy chastising the district court for
"openly overruling previous decisions of this [Supreme] Court," that its members did not
examine the rationale for a temporal sequence of damage requirement, nor did the court
articulate reasons for such an unusual damage requirement. Id. at 594.
130. See Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 468 nn.1 & 2 (discussion of the extent of the plaintiff's
physical injuries).
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cent cases,18 ' appeared for the first time in Florida in Crane v. Lof-
tin.'83 At its first appearance, the court acted as though impact
had been in the Florida cases all along-although in fact, Florida
courts had been applying temporal sequence, proximate cause, 33
and physical injury requirements for over sixty years.' The defen-
dant railroad ran into plaintiff's car (from which she had already
alighted in haste) at a downtown crossing. She sought recovery for
"personal injuries alleged to have resulted from fright."" 8 The
court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint because she
failed to prove malice.' 6 But, in dictum, the court mentioned im-
pact,8 7 and the long-lived impact requirement thus spread to
Florida.'"
In the intervening years, the court has also denied recovery and
cited the impact requirement where defendant's negligently vibrat-
ing airplane placed the plaintiffs in fear of their lives;39 where de-
fendant hospital sent plaintiff's infant home with the wrong par-
131. See Champion, 420 So. 2d 348 (currently before the Florida Supreme Court for
review).
132. 70 So. 2d 574 (FI& 1954).
133. See discussion of the proximate cause requirement, infra.
134. Florida is one of the last jurisdictions to observe the impact limitation. See Cham-
pion, 420 So. 2d 348 n.1 (relating that at least thirty-five jurisdictions have abandoned the
impact requirement).
135. Crane, 70 So. 2d at 575. From the language of International Ocean, 14 So. 148, this
would be the wrong temporal sequence of damages. See the discussion of temporal sequence,
supra.
136. Crane, 70 So. 2d at 575. Plaintiff tried to bring the facts of the case within the
scope of Kirksey by alleging that defendant's excessive speed in a populated city was evi-
dence of "great indifference" sufficient to impute malice. Id.
137. We have the view that under the controlling law [of malicious mental distress]
as to the right of a plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from
fright and mental anguish unaccompanied by direct physical impact or trauma,
the plaintiff has failed to allege a case for recovery based upon willful and wanton
negligence of the defendant.
Id. at 576.
The court may have been using impact as a synonym for both trauma and physical injury.
See STEDMAN'S MaDicAL DiCTION~AY 1476 (5th lawyers' ed. 1982) which defines trauma as an
injury caused by harsh contact with an object. Or the court may have been discounting the
plaintiff's alleged physical injury because it did not occur in the temporal sequence required
by International Ocean, 14 So. 148.
138. Ironically, most jurisdictions have subsequently abandoned the impact requirement.
Florida remains in a small minority. See Champion, 420 So. 2d 348 n.1.
139. Herlong Aviation, Inc. v. Johnson, 291 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1974). Plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant was negligent in the manufacture of the plane. The Second District Court of
Appeal had held for the plaintiffs, observing that "the time has come when the impact doc-
trine serves no useful purpose." Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc., 271 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla.
2d DCA 1972).
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ents; 4 1 where defendant's ceiling collapsed and nearly hit a
child;1 41 where defendant's car hit plaintiff's home, and the excite-
ment of the collision caused a heart attack, stroke, and eventual
death;1 42 where defendant's drug produced birth defects in plain-
tiff's infant;14 3 where defendant hospital lost the body of plaintiff's
premature infant; 44 where defendant insurer wrongfully denied
benefits to plaintiff, its insured; 48 where defendant's negligently
constructed coffin, bearing the body of plaintiff's mother, collapsed
before her eyes;1 46 where defendant bill-collecting doctors sent a
claim which had never been filed to the plaintiff, their former pa-
tient; 47 where, as a result of defendant's failure to provide ade-
quate security, plaintiff, a young child, witnessed her mother's sex-
ual assault; 48 where, as a result of defendant bank's failure to
provide adequate security, plaintiff, its employee-teller, was
140. Carter, 213 So. 2d 898. The child was returned to the hospital unharmed after sev-
eral hours; the plaintiff mother sustained no physical injury. Id. at 899.
141. Arcia, 264 So. 2d 865. The court also implied approval of the temporal sequence
test of injury announced in International Ocean when it said that the injuries, if any, were
caused solely by fright, that is, if there was any physical injury, it followed rather than
preceded the mental injury. Id.
142. Gilliam, 291 So. 2d 593. See Stewart, 271 So. 2d 466 for facts of case. Mrs. Stewart
never had the opportunity to put the case before a jury because Mrs. Stewart was candid
enough to admit that she felt no physical impact and that neither she nor her house shook
as a result of the collision. Id. at 467-68.
143. Pazo, 310 So. 2d 30.
144. Brooks, 325 So. 2d 479. The court based its holding on the lack of "any physical
impact or physical injury." Id.
145. Saltmarsh, 344 So. 2d 862. This case is interesting because the trial judge equated
the impact requirement with a battery requirement.
[T]he trial judge found as a matter of law that a cause of action does not exist
under Florida law for a claim for punitive damages, emotional distress and/or
mental pain and anguish arising out of the manner in which a first party insurance
contract is breached in the absence of a battery.
Id. at 863.
It is not correct to call the requirement a battery requirement because the impact require-
ment applies in negligence cases only, and battery is an intentional act.
146. Estate of Harper, 366 So. 2d 126. This case was brought as an intentional mental
distress cause of action, but the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal based upon negli-
gence principles. Id. at 128. A unique rationale was urged by the court in this case. The
court urged that courts take a realistic look at negligent mental distress cases, without artifi-
cial impediments like the contact requirement, in order to deter "resort to self help, perhaps
even violence." Id.
147. Steiner, 334 So. 2d 39. The debtor, recovering from surgery, stopped eating and
sleeping for a time, and died during the lawsuit. The court remanded for recovery under the
Unfair Collections Practices Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 559.72(10), .77(1) (1975). Steiner, 334 So. 2d
at 42.
148. Woodman, 367 So. 2d 1061. This resulted in emotional distress and medical ex-
penses to one of the plaintiff's minor daughters. Id. at 1062.
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handed a hold-up note;" '4 where defendant collided with plaintiff's
auto, and her child was injured in it;1 50 where defendant's agent
accepted money to promote plaintiff's product, and did not do
so;' where defendant doctor negligently misrepresented to plain-
tiff that her disease was not inheritable, and her child was born
with the disease;152 where defendant policeman possessed plain-
tiff's car, which had been stolen, but not by the plaintiff, and
plaintiff had to recover the car in a replevin action;153 and where
149. Davis, 408 So. 2d 608. Davis argued that the robber's act of handing her his hold-
up note satisfied Florida's impact requirement, but the court disagreed with her, even
though the defendant viewed impact as contact. The court decided that impact, in this case,
meant physical injury, not mere contact.
If appellant alleged additional facts to show that her mental distress was not com-
pensable under the [Workers' Compensation] Act, i.e., that she suffered no physi-
cal injury, then due to the 'physical impact' rule, appellant would have been
precluded from recovering under a common-law theory of negligence. On the other
hand, if appellant alleged a physical impact or injury so as to recover under a
negligence theory, then her claim would be barred by the exclusiveness of liability
of the Workers' Compensation Act as mental anguish resulting from a physical
injury is compensable. As appellant is precluded from recovery under either set of
facts, the deficiencies in the complaint could not have been cured by amendment.
Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
On review, the First District Court of Appeal concluded that there was no way for plain-
tiff to recover because, on the one hand, the Workers' Compensation law precluded recovery
for mental injury, and on the other hand, the Workers' Compensation law provided the
exclusive remedy for her injuries. Davis v. Sun Banks, 412 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
150. Selfe, 397 So. 2d 348.
151. Friedman v. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 380 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
This case confuses the requirements of an intentional mental distress action with a malice
action in that it adds punitive damages to the requirements of outrageous conduct and se-
vere distress and cites Kirksey as the source of this statement. Id. at 1314. The outrageous
conduct and severe distress requirements have their origin in Slocum v. Food Fair Stores,
100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958). The Florida cases dealing with punitive damages (Kirksey and
its progeny) have never been analyzed as intentional tort cases, but rather as a class of cases
dealing with conduct more than negligent but less than intentional (namely conduct evi-
dencing malice or great indifference to the person or property of another). When the cause
of action for intentional infliction of mental distress was presented to the Florida Supreme
Court in Slocum, the court identified the cause as novel in Florida-a case of first impres-
sion. Recall that Slocum was presented eight years after Kirksey. Negligence cases devel-
oped to impose liability for wrongdoing short of malice, that is, short of "great indifference,"
in which impact was necessary. Impact took on different meanings: contact in some cases,
physical injury in others.
152. Moores, 405 So. 2d 1022. The child was born with Larsen's Syndrome, a defect of
the kneecap which causes crippling. Id. at 1024. See DoRLAmN's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY (24th ed. 1965). The appellate court allowed the cause to proceed for damages rep-
resenting the portion of the cost of raising Justin in excess of the cost of raising a normal
child. Moores, 405 So. 2d at 1027.
153. Claycomb, 399 So. 2d 1050. An interesting point in the case is the fact that the
plaintiffs put on expert testimony that "they both suffered physical injury from the emo-
tional distress of the incident." Id. at 1051. Thus, this court concluded that physical injury
did not satisfy the impact requirement, or else did not believe the expert testimony.
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defendant airline intentionally grounded one of its pilots, who had
publicly complained about the safety of its aircraft.15 4
On the other hand, the court has permitted recovery under the
impact rule where defendant negligently allowed a runaway surge
of electricity to damage plaintiff's property, and there was evi-
dence that the electricity was transmitted to the plaintiff;155 where
defendant collided with plaintiff's automobile, and the accident ex-
acerbated plaintiff's preexisting Parkinson's Disease;156 where de-
fendant negligently included a rat in a cola, and plaintiff vomited
and lost his taste for colas; 57 where defendant negligently failed to
cancel plaintiff's life insurance policy, despite notice that plaintiff's
wife was plotting to kill him; 5 1 and where defendant collided with
plaintiff's automobile, and the plaintiff's injuries prevented him
from aiding his mother, a passenger in his car, who died as a result
of her injuries." 9
These cases are inconsistent because impact sufficient to support
recovery sometimes means contact between the plaintiff (or some-
thing closely associated with the plaintiff) and the defendant (or
the defendant's agent or product); yet sometimes this kind of con-
tact does not support recovery.
For example, in Hollie,'"1 impact sufficient to support recovery
154. Gellert, 370 So. 2d 802. This case is troublesome because the court expressly con-
fuses the requirements of an intentional tort action, which are outrageous conduct and se-
vere distress, with the requirement of a negligent tort action, which is usually expressed as
impact or contact, despite the fact that the plaintiff chose an intentional cause of action,
and did not file an alternative count in negligence. Id. at 803. "The principal question
presented by this appeal is whether . . . one may recover damages for intentional infliction
of severe mental distress which is without physical contact, and which is not incidental to
or consequent upon any separate tort or other actionable wrong. The judgment appealed
from was predicated on the trial court answering that question in the negative. We hold that
in so ruling the trial court was correct, and affirm the judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
Physical contact is not a requirement in an intentional mental distress action. When the
defendant intends mental distress, that is enough, provided the harm that results is severe
and the defendant's conduct is highly offensive to reasonable people. See Korbin, 177 So. 2d
551; Abraham Used Car Co. 208 So. 2d 500. The proper holding of Gellert is best stated in
the concurring opinion, which correctly identified the requirements of a cause of action for
intentional mental distress, and the holding of Slocum: "[Nleither the actions of the defen-
dant, . . . nor the effect of those actions upon the mental well-being of the plaintiff, . . .
were of the thoroughly horrendous character required to make out such a claim." Gellert,
370 So. 2d at 808.
155. Clark, 107 So. 2d 609.
156. Hollie v. Radcliffe, 200 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).
157. Way, 260 So. 2d 288.
158. Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155.
159. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Bostic, 423 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
160. 200 So. 2d 616.
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was found in the defendant's violent contact with the plaintiff's
car, ' but the sole physical manifestation of injury was the exacer-
bation of the plaintiff's Parkinson's Disease. 1 2 But in Gilliam,'"
defendant's violent contact with plaintiff's home, which precipi-
tated the plaintiff's heart attack, stroke, and eventual death, went
uncompensated.'"
Similarly, in Clark,''5 impact sufficient to support recovery was
found in the contact between the defendant's product, electricity,
and the plaintiff. Yet, in Pazo,'" contact between defendant's
product, a birth-defect-producing drug, and the plaintiff, the
mother of a child born with birth defects, went uncompensated.
One might surmise that Mrs. Pazo did not recover because she
sought mental distress damages for her distress at her child's birth
defects, rather than her own injuries. But in Bostic,167 the plaintiff
was compensated for his distress at his mother's injuries in an auto
accident, about which he was helpless to do anything. This does
not differ significantly from Mrs. Pazo's helplessness in the face of
her child's injuries. Herlong,'" provides another example of con-
tact between defendant's product, a vibrating airplane, and the
1
161. At the trial the uncontradicted evidence showed that the defendant's automo-
bile ran a stop sign and collided with the driver's side of the car driven by [the
plaintiff], causing about $500 damages to the latter's car ... this evidence was
sufficient to support a finding ... that there was an impact that would satisfy the
above "impact rule."
Hollie, 200 So. 2d at 618.
If the Hollie case holds that property damage will satisfy the impact requirement, it is
inconsistent with Crane, 70 So. 2d 574, in which contact between defendant's train and
plaintiff's car, from which plaintiff had escaped in fear of her life, did not satisfy the impact
requirement, and Herlong, 291 So. 2d 603, in which defendant's vibrating plane placed
plaintiffs in fear of their lives. Both cases involved considerable property damage. If the
Hollie case holds that touching an extension of the plaintiff is the legal equivalent of touch-
ing the plaintiff, it is inconsistent with Gilliam, 291 So. 2d 593, in which contact with plain-
tiff's house did not satisfy the impact requirement, despite very serious physical in-
jury-heart attack and eventual death.
162. The plaintiff was required to take an indefinite leave of absence because of his
tremors, with the understanding that he could return if his tremors diminished sufficiently
to allow him to discharge his clerical duties. Hollie, 200 So. 2d at 617. The court reaffirmed
the thin skull rule-a defendant will be liable for aggravating a preexisting condition of the
plaintiff. Id. at 618.
163. 291 So. 2d 593.
164. See Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 468 nn.1 & 2 (explanation of the extent of the plaintiffs
physical injuries). The doctor testified: "[W]hat happened that day was due to the accident,
and it wasn't her day to have a myocardial infarction." Id. at 468.
165. 107 So. 2d 609.
166. 310 So. 2d 30.
167. 423 So. 2d 915.
168. 291 So. 2d 603.
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plaintiffs that went uncompensated, despite plaintiffs' fear for
their lives in a transoceanic flight.
Nor does impact sufficient to support recovery always mean vio-
lent injurious physical contact between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant. For example, in Way,169 recovery was permitted where the
contact was not so violent, not so injurious, and not between plain-
tiff and defendant directly but only between plaintiff and defen-
dant's product. Way's mouth touched a rat negligently included in
a cola, and he vomited. The Way court, in a burst of candor, ad-
mitted that courts have affirmed rules restricting recovery, "but on
the factual situation" before them, the consumer would be pro-
tected "whatever the theory. 17 0 But in the Pazol7l case, where the
contact between the plaintiff and the defendant's product, a birth-
defect-producing drug, was injurious, there was no recovery. This
case implies that harmful drugs are not the legal equivalent of un-
wholesome food,173 but the contact is the same, for obviously Mrs.
Pazo ingested (had contact with) the defendant's birth-defect-pro-
ducing drug. A drug passing through the body of the plaintiff, and
causing significant changes within it, ought to satisfy the contact
requirement.1 7 3 Even appellate judges get confused on this contact
question. For example, the concurring judge in Pazo thought im-
pact meant contact. 1 7  But his colleagues concluded it meant some-
thing else.1 75
169. 260 So. 2d 288.
170. Id. at 289-90. The Way court also presented yet another variation upon physical
injury requirement-"physical reaction." The "physical reaction" is something short of
physical injury, but would apparently suffice, for the court says that although no action
exists where a mental injury is "not produced by, connected with, or the result of physical
suffering or injury. . . [a]n entirely different question would have been presented, had the
plaintiff become nauseated and vomited as a result of the taste or toxic effect of the con-
taminated drink and had the mental condition been a result of or been connected with the
physical reaction." Id. at 289 (emphasis added) (quoting Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Francis, 245 P.2d 84 (Old. 1952)).
171. 310 So. 2d 30.
172. See Way, 260 So. 2d 288; Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860. This result may be explained by
the fact that drugs are more useful than colas. But this may not be the right result given the
fact that the harm wrought by drugs is much more serious than vomiting and diarrhea
caused by rats and worms in food and drink.
173. This contact is not very different from electricity, Clark, 107 So. 2d 609, or alcohol
through the body, Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155.
174. "I am of the opinion that the appellant (mother) may recover for mental pain and
anguish sustained by her because of the ingestion of the drug.... " Pazo, 310 So. 2d at 31
(emphasis added).
175. They don't tell us what. But they say, "[t]here was no 'impact' between the drug
and either of the appellants," ignoring the fact that one of the appellants had ingested the
drug. Id. at 30.
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And in Lopez,"7 6 too, there was recovery where contact was vio-
lent, but not physically injurious, and not between plaintiff and
defendant, not even between plaintiff and defendant's agent or
product. The defendant insurer negligently failed to cancel Lopez's
life insurance policy, despite notice that his wife was plotting to
kill him. Her attempt to kill him by tying his hands and pouring
alcohol down his throat, in preparation for drowning him, was in-
terrupted by the police, without physical injury resulting, but with
considerable mental distress. Yet, in the Herlong case,'17 7 where
there was contact between plaintiff and defendant's product, and
the contact was violent, and no less injurious, there was no
recovery.
Recovery was permitted in Hollie,'78 where the violent contact
occurred between defendant and plaintiff's car, though the result-
ing injury was not physical, but rather an increased level of anxi-
ety, which made the plaintiff's preexisting disease worse. Yet no
recovery was permitted in Gilliam,17 where the violent contact
with plaintiff's house was physically injurious to the plaintiff, and
very serious, despite the testimony of the plaintiff's doctor that she
had no prior history of coronary disease, and that the accident
caused her physical injuries.""0
And despite violent injurious physical contact between defen-
dant and plaintiff's car in Selfe,"' there was no recovery for Mrs.
Selfe's distress at her child's injuries. 18 Yet in Bostic,5 5 which also
involved a violent injurious physical contact between defendant
and plaintiff's car, the court permitted recovery, where the plaintiff
was so seriously hurt in an auto accident that he could not respond
to his mother's call for help, and she died in the same accident. He
suffered a "severe emotional problem stemming from his inability
to do anything to help or save his mother."'1 The only difference
176. 406 So. 2d 1155.
177. 291 So. 2d 603.
178. 200 So. 2d 616.
179. 291 So. 2d 593.
180. The doctor testified: "[W]hat happened that day was due to the accident, and it
wasn't her day to have a myocardial infarction." Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 468.
181. 397 So. 2d 348.
182. "[S]atisfying the 'impact rule'. . . until now has gained plaintiff damages for only
that mental distress which is due to plaintiff's own injury, or to the traumatic event consid-
ered in relation to plaintiff alone." Id. at 350.
183. 423 So. 2d 915.
184. Id. at 916. The majority said that on these facts the impact requirement was satis-
fied. Id. at 917. The concurring judge agreed, but he thought "the reasons for the rule have
been thoroughly repudiated and. . . the rule should be abolished and replaced. . . by some
1983] MENTAL DISTRESS
between Selfe and Bostic was the fact that the Selfe infant did not
ask for help-but he probably cried a lot, and his mother was
probably as unable to soothe him as the plaintiff in Bostic was un-
able to help his dying mother. And of course the plaintiff in
Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Wills, 85 recovered for the
mental distress he felt as a result of his dog's heating-pad burn.
To further complicate the picture, there was recovery in
Clark,'86 where the violent contact was not between plaintiff and
defendant, but between plaintiff and defendant's product, electric-
ity; yet no recovery in Pazo, 87 where the contact between plaintiff
and defendant's product, a drug, was equally harmful; and no re-
covery in Herlong,188 where the contact between plaintiff and de-
fendant's product, a vibrating airplane, was equally violent.
The impact requirement is an expression of a strong judicial re-
luctance to impose liability for subjective injuries such as mental
distress, when occasioned by mere negligence. But a more effective
and less capricious way to insure that injuries are authentic would
be to require expert medical testimony regarding injury,'89 rather
than imposing a mechanical and rigid requirement like impact.
And to insure the necessary nexus between defendant's careless-
ness and plaintiff's injury, a proximate cause test, not an impact
test, should be used.
more enlightened rule." Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
185. 360 So. 2d 37.
186. 107 So. 2d 609.
187. 310 So. 2d 30.
188. 291 So. 2d 603.
189. This is in fact what Justice Adkins recommended in his dissent in Gilliam, 291 So.
2d at 596.
In my opinion, where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a
result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's negligent conduct,
a plaintiff should be allowed to maintain an action and recover damages for such
physical consequences to himself regardless of the absence of any physical impact.
In applying this principle, I refer only to a situation in which a defendant's
wrongful act, absent any physical impact, causes a mental disturbance which oper-
ates internally to produce "definite and objective physical injuries of an ascertain-
able nature." It does not apply to an action for mental or emotional disturbance
unconnected with a resulting physical injury.
Id. at 596 (original emphasis omitted).
See also Champion, 420 So. 2d 348. The Champion court urged an "objective medical
determination" test. Id. at 353. "[T]he harm for which plaintiff seeks to recover must be
susceptible to some form of objective medical determination and proved through qualified
medical witnesses." Id. The requirement of expert medical testimony regarding injury is
also the approach taken in other jurisdictions. See Swanson v. Swanson, 257 N.E.2d 194 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1970).
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D. Proximate Cause
A consideration of proximate cause is the most desirable test to
delimit the cause of action for negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress. This is so because proximate cause provides both necessary
flexibility, and at least as much certainty as other tests currently
used to delimit the cause of action.
The proximate cause test is not new. The Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Wells"90 case employed a proximate cause test for
mental distress: if mental distress damages are foreseeable, if they
are the natural and probable consequences of the defendant's neg-
ligence, they will be recovered.191 The defendant erroneously trans-
mitted a message to pay "G. Wake. Wells" as "G. Wake. Fells,"
and its agent refused to pay over the funds at issue until a correc-
tion was telegraphed, despite Wells having made it clear to the de-
fendant that failure to pay over the money would force him to
travel a long journey with his wife and small children without
money for food."12
At least a dozen Florida cases have been analyzed using a proxi-
mate cause test. Recovery for mental distress was permitted where
the defendant failed to deliver a telegram instructing the plaintiff
to secure a sleeping car, resulting in her traveling with her children
at night in a day coach;"93 where defendant erroneously tele-
graphed a message that the plaintiffs child had diphtheria, result-
ing in the administration of diphtheria antitoxin, which greatly ex-
acerbated the child's illness, and caused the plaintiff two days of
agony during which he was uncertain whether his child would live
or die;" 4 where the defendant negligently electrified a consumer
with a runaway power surge;1"5 where the defendant's negligently
created gas explosion caused the plaintiff fright, flight, collision
and injury;'" and where the defendant negligently included a rat
in a cola.197 The court allowed a case to proceed to the jury where
defendant negligently ignored plaintiff's request to cancel his life
190. 39 So. 838.
191. Id. at 841.
192. Id. at 839.
193. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 100 So. 163 (Fla. 1924).
194. Redding, 129 So. 743.
195. Clark, 107 So. 2d 609.
196. Hoitt, 182 So. 2d 58. The gas-powered plaintiff, a waitress, collided with a fellow
restaurant worker, was knocked down, and injured. Id. at 59.
197. Way, 260 So. 2d 288.
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insurance policy because plaintiff's wife was plotting to kill him. 98
In addition, the intermediate court approved recovery where de-
fendant's automobile negligently collided with plaintiff's home,
causing plaintiff great excitement, and heart attack.1"
In these cases, the court allowed recovery because mental dis-
tress damages were foreseeable, that is, natural and probable, from
the defendant's acts;'"0 because mental distress damages followed
closely in time and space upon the defendant's negligence;201 and
because mental distress followed in a direct and unbroken se-
quence of events from defendant's negligence.0 2 Recovery for
mental distress was denied where defendant negligently failed to
deliver the message: "Meet me. . . don't fail"; 08 and where defen-
dant negligently embalmed the body of plaintiff's wife.20 Recovery
was denied in these cases because damages were not foreseeable,' e"
thus too remote or speculative.'"
In addition to the above cases, several courts have expressed a
preference for a proximate cause analysis, but have felt obliged to
apply the impact requirement, and thus to deny recovery. For ex-
ample, where defendant, a drunk driver, killed a child, causing her
mother to die from shock at the scene of the accident, the court
noted that such damage was foreseeable and should be compen-
sated, but denied recovery because of the impact rule.0 7 Likewise,
where the defendant's negligently constructed coffin collapsed
while the deceased's family was present, causing them distress, the
198. Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155.
199. Stewart, 271 So. 2d 466.
200. Clark, 107 So. 2d 609; Redding, 129 So. 743; Taylor, 100 So. 163; Wells, 39 So. 838.
201. "[T]he circumstances [of injury) had occurred so suddenly and the injury had fol-
lowed so closely, the conclusion of relationship between them was inescapable." Clark, 107
So. 2d at 612; see also Hoitt, 182 So. 2d 58.
202. Stewart, 271 So. 2d 466. Recovery was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court,
which woodenly applied an impact test, without regard to proximate cause considerations.
Gilliam, 291 So. 2d 593.
203. Hildreth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 47 So. 820, 821 (Fla. 1908).
204. Dunahoo, 200 So. 541.
205. Hildreth, 47 So. 820.
206. Dunahoo, 200 So. 541.
207. Champion, 420 So. 2d 348. The proximate cause approach to mental distress was
evident in the plaintiff's arguments. "Mr. Champion alleged that he lost his daughter, then
his wife, as a direct and proximate result of the actions of the driver." Id. at 349. It was also
evident in the court's language. "The problem with the zone of danger rule ... is that it is
an inadequate measure of the reasonable foreseeability of the possibility of physical injury
resulting from a parent's anxiety arising from harm to his child." Id. at 351. "Thus, we
believe traditional principles of negligence analysis may be applied in such cases and the
imposition of undue liability may be avoided by using the broader test of reasonable fore-
seeability." Id. at 352.
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court indicated such distress was reasonably foreseeable and
should be compensated, but denied recovery because of the impact
rule.2 08
One effect of employing a proximate cause test to delimit the
negligent mental distress action would be to allow jurors to partici-
pate in the policy determination regarding limitations upon the
cause of action. Undoubtedly, jurors would be at least as sympa-
thetic to dead people as dead dogs, and this would probably be a
good thing. Proximate cause is at least as certain a test as impact.
And there are a great many cases extant to provide guidance for
courts in this area. A proximate cause test requires that one con-
sider the foreseeability of harm,20 9 the proximity in time and space
between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's harm, 10 whether
plaintiff's harm follows defendant's negligence in a direct and un-
broken sequence of events, 1 ' and whether the plaintiff was fore-
seeable, or whether the plaintiff was present in a foreseeable zone
of danger. 2 These considerations have provided the parameters
for tort liability in negligence cases for quite some time, and would
208. Estate of Harper, 366 So. 2d 126.
209. For a discussion of foreseeability, see Dunahoo, 200 So. 2d 541; Hildreth, 47 So.
820. In both of these cases the court concluded that harm was not foreseeable. See also
Clark, 107 So. 2d 609; Redding, 129 So. 743; Taylor, 100 So. 163; Wells, 39 So. 838; Metro-
politan Life, 8 Fla. L.W. 994; Champion, 420 So. 2d 348; Lopez, 406 So. 2d 1155; Estate of
Harper, 366 So. 2d 126; Stewart, 271 So. 2d 466; Way, 260 So. 2d 288; Hoitt, 182 So. 2d 58.
In these cases the court concluded that harm was foreseeable. In Champion there is also a
suggestion of esoteric new tests to be used: contemporaneous observance, physical proximity
to the accident, parental relationship to the injured, status of the injured as a minor, etc. Id.
at 353-54. All of these could and should be considered under the traditional proximate cause
analysis, rather than confusing the issue with separate enumerated criteria. The court sug-
gests that "[i]t does not matter whether these factors are regarded as policy considerations
imposing limitations on the scope of reasonable foreseeability. . ., or as factors bearing on
the determination of reasonable foreseeability itself." Id. at 353 (quoting Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978)). Unfortunately, it makes a great deal of
difference. The latter would be a much simpler, more flexible determination.
For the classic discussion of foreseeability in proximate cause, see Overseas Tankship
(U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co., Ltd., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (Wagon
Mound No. 1) and Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. [1967] A.C. 617
(P.C.) (Wagon Mound No. 2).
210. See Clark, 107 So. 2d 609; Hoitt, 182 So. 2d 58. For a discussion of spacial proxim-
ity in proximate cause, see also Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1866).
211. See Gilliam, 291 So. 2d 593; Wells, 39 So. 838. For the classic discussion of direct-
ness in proximate cause, see In re Arbitration between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co.,
Ltd., 3 K.B. 560 (C.A. 1921).
212. See Champion, 420 So. 2d 348. For the classic discussion of the foreseeable plaintiff
and the zone of danger in proximate cause, see Pasgraff v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
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provide more flexibility and at least as much certainty in negligent
mental distress cases as present mechanical and capricious devices
such as impact.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a considerable body of case law in Florida in the areas
of malicious, intentional, and negligent mental distress. There is a
lack of proportionality of result between malice cases, where dis-
tress over loss of pets is compensated, and negligence cases, where
distress over loss of human life is uncompensated. In the cause of
action for negligent infliction of mental distress, the impact re-
quirement, which usually means a contact requirement, has led to
undesirable inconsistencies among the cases.
The Florida Supreme Court has a current opportunity to review
and bring harmony to the area of negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress, the only area in which impact is relevant, and to restore pro-
portionality of result between negligence and malice cases. The
proximate cause requirement, which embraces a consideration of
the foreseeability of harm, directness of harm, foreseeability of the
plaintiff in a zone of danger, and the temporal and spacial relation-
ship between negligence and harm, is a familiar delimitation in the
law of torts. It provides more flexibility than the impact require-
ment, with at least as much consistency. It is a flexible yet predict-
able standard by which to judge the negligence cause of action. For
these reasons, the impact requirement should be rejected and a
traditional proximate cause limitation adopted.
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